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specific  risk  is  offset  by  a  substantial  reduction  in  market-level  exchange  exposure  in  most 
Eurozone countries, so the advent of the Eurozone appears to have been associated with a shift in 
exchange  risk  from  systematic  to  firm-specific.  We  also  find  that  Eurozone  firms’  exchange 
exposure is greater than that of non-Eurozone European firms, and univariate testing confirms the 
significance  of  this  difference.  In  a  multivariate  setting,  however,  after  controlling  for 
countryspecific and firm-specific characteristics that potentially influence the extent of exposure – 
economic  openness,  governance  factors,  firm  size,  industry  and  several  financial  ratios  –  this 
difference is no longer apparent. 
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Using a sample of 1,154 European firms from 11 countries, we show that firm-level exchange 
exposure for Eurozone and non-Eurozone European firms has increased since the advent of the 
euro, but this rise was smaller for Eurozone than non-Eurozone firms.  The increase in firm-
specific  risk  is  offset  by  a  substantial  reduction  in  market-level  exchange  exposure  in  most 
Eurozone countries, so the advent of the Eurozone appears to have been associated with a shift in 
exchange risk from systematic to firm-specific.  We also find that Eurozone firms’ exchange 
exposure is greater than that of non-Eurozone European firms, and univariate testing confirms the 
significance of this difference.  In a multivariate setting, however, after controlling for country-
specific  and  firm-specific  characteristics  that  potentially  influence  the  extent  of  exposure  –
economic openness, governance factors, firm size, industry and several financial ratios – this 
difference is no longer apparent.
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1. Introduction
One of the purported benefits of a single currency zone is that foreign exchange risk is eliminated 
for  intra-zone  trade  and  investment,  reducing  uncertainty  for  firms  operating  across  national 
borders (Eichengreen, 1990).  For the Eurozone specifically, the elimination of exchange risk has 
been cited in various EU policy documents as an important benefit of Eurozone membership (see, 
for example, EU, 1995 and EU, 2007).  With the Eurozone now approaching 10 years old, it is 
timely to look at Eurozone firms’ exchange exposure; a topic that has received surprisingly little 
empirical attention.  We examine the issue by comparing the exchange exposure of a sample of 
Eurozone  and  non-Eurozone  European  firms.    Our  data  set  comprises  1,154  firms  from  11 
European countries: 7 Eurozone members – Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain, and 4 non-Eurozone countries – Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK.
In the first stage of our research, we estimate firm-level exchange exposure in two periods: the 
pre-euro period from January 1990 to December 1998, and the post-euro period from January 
1999 to January 2008.  This is conducted using the technique pioneered by Jorion (1990) that has 
become  standard  in  the  exchange  exposure  literature,  involving  a  time-series  regression  of 
changes  in  the  trade-weighted  exchange  rate  against  the  return  on  a  firm’s  stock,  while 
controlling for market effects.  We find that exchange exposure increased after the introduction of 
the euro for both Eurozone
1 and non-Eurozone firms, and also that Eurozone firms have higher 
exchange rate exposure than non-Eurozone firms.  Although exchange exposure increased from 
the pre-euro to the post-euro period for firms within and outside the Eurozone, the increase was 
smaller  for  Eurozone  firms,  and  this  is  weakly  supportive  of  the  benefits  of  Eurozone 
membership  alluded  to  above.    However,  our  apparently  anomalous  findings  prompt  further 
investigation.    If  firm-level  or  ‘idiosyncratic’  exchange  exposure  has  increased,  what  has 
happened to exposure at the level of the market?  In the second stage of our analysis, we find that 
market-level  exposure  has  declined  in  Eurozone  countries  by  more  than  it  has  outside  the 
Eurozone.
In the third stage of our research, we investigate why firms in the Eurozone continue to have 
higher exchange exposure than firms in our sample non-Eurozone countries.  Using the exchange 
response coefficients estimated from the firm-specific time-series regressions as the dependent 
                                                
1 This is in contrast to Bartram and Karolyi (2006), who found a reduction in exchange exposure after the 
advent of the euro, although this was economically and statistically small.  Bartram and Karolyi’s data set, 
however, extends only to the end of 2001.3
variable, we run cross-sectional regressions to determine whether this difference can be explained 
by  country-level  and  firm-specific  factors  that  have  been  found  in  prior  studies  to  explain 
exchange exposure.  The country-level factors are economic openness, shareholder rights and 
creditor rights; and the firm-specific factors are size, industry, and four financial ratios: debt-to-
assets,  market-to-book,  quick  ratio,  and  dividend  payout  ratio.    After  controlling  for  these
characteristics,  we  find  no  difference  between  the  firm-specific  exchange  exposure  of  firms 
within and outside the Eurozone.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  In section 2 we describe our approach to 
estimating firm-level exchange exposure and present our data set.  Sections 3 and 4 present our 
findings on firm-level and market-level exchange exposure respectively.  In section 5 we discuss 
and present our findings on the firm-level pooled cross-sectional analysis, and section 6 provides 
concluding comments. 
2. Method and data
Our sample comprises firms from 7 Eurozone members: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain; and 4 non-Eurozone countries: two EU members (Sweden and 
the UK) and two non-EU European countries (Norway and Switzerland).  Our exchange rate data 
are IMF monthly nominal effective trade-weighted exchange rates from January 1990 to January 
2008  (sourced  from  Datastream),  with  an  increase  in  the  exchange  rate  index  indicating  an 
appreciation of the currency.  Our stock price and market index data are also from Datastream, 
and the index data are Datastream weighted indexes for each country.  We divide the data into 
two nearly-equal time periods: January 1990 to December 1998 and January 1999 to January 
2008.  Summary information on the exchange rates and the exchange rate arrangements of our 
sample countries is presented in Table 1.  We report the mean and standard deviation of the 
exchange rate log change for each period.  As expected, exchange rate volatility (as measured by 
standard deviation of the log change) falls for the Eurozone countries after the introduction of the 
euro, from an average of 1.02 to 0.65.  Volatility also falls for the Swedish, Swiss and UK 
currencies, but it rises substantially from the  1990s to  the 2000s for  Norway.  This  may be 
because Norway switched from a managed float (in place from 1992 to 2001) to an independent 
float in 2002.4
Adler  and  Dumas  (1984)  suggested  that  the  foreign  exchange  exposure  of  a  firm  can  be 
quantified by measuring the sensitivity of equity returns to exchange rate changes.  An extensive 
body of work has subsequently examined the relation between exchange exposure and firm value 
using this and similar approaches, although it has mostly been operationalised via Jorion’s (1990) 
technique  of  measuring  the  sensitivity  of  equity  returns  to  exchange  rate  changes  while 
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, is the log difference return on stock i in country j and
j
t R  is the return on country j’s 
benchmark stock index for time period t, with each measured in local currency, and 
j
t s is the log 
difference change in country j’s trade-weighted exchange rate index over the same time period.  
This 2-factor model is generally considered superior to Adler and Dumas’ (1984) specification 
which omits the market factor.  The inclusion of a market index is designed to control for the 
macroeconomic effects of exchange rate movements; exchange rates and stock prices may move 
together simply because they are driven by the same shocks.  The coefficient on the exchange rate 
variable 
i
2   therefore measures idiosyncratic (or ‘residual’) exchange exposure for firm i (Jorion, 
1990).  
A firm is subject to economic (or operating) foreign exchange exposure if changes in exchange 
rates  affect  expected  future  cash  flows,  and  therefore  firm  value.    This  includes  transaction 
exposure,  involving  known  foreign  currency  receivables  or  payables,  and  indirect  economic 
exposure  (sometimes  referred  to  as  competitive  exposure) which  arises  when  suppliers  or 
competitors are directly exposed.  While the former is straightforward to hedge using currency 
derivatives, economic exposure is hard to measure and can be difficult and costly to hedge, and it 
is in eliminating this type of exposure that the greater benefits of Eurozone membership would 
arise.  In early studies of firm-level exchange exposure, samples often comprised firms with a 
certain minimum proportion of export sales, on the basis that firms with international transactions 
are likely to be more exposed than those without (see, for example, Jorion, 1990; Donnelly and 
Sheehy, 1996; Chow, Lee and Solt, 1997; He and Ng, 1998).  However, not only does theory 
relating to exchange exposure suggest that it extends beyond international transactions, but as 
Dominguez  and  Tesar  (2001a)  argue,  firms  with  indirect  exchange  exposure  may  be  more 
exposed  than  those  with  direct  exposure,  since  the  latter  are  more  likely  to  hedge  foreign 
exchange transactions, and because they are more likely to have natural hedges in place, such as 5
FDI.  This contention receives some support from Miller and Reuer’s (1998) finding that FDI has 
a negative effect on a firm’s exchange exposure while export intensity has no effect.  Further, 
Pantzalis, Simkins and Laux (2001) found that firms that operate across a greater number of 
countries are associated with less exchange exposure.  Our data set comprises 1,154 firms with 
stock price data available on Datastream for the period January 1990 to January 2008.  Numbers 
for each country and other information about the sample firms can be found in Table 2, which is 
discussed in detail in the next section.  We estimate the model in equation [1] for each of our 
sample firms using robust regressions with Newey-West standard errors.
3. Firm-level exchange exposure
Table 2 summarises our results from estimating equation [1] on the full data set of 1,154 firms for 
the two sub-periods pre-euro (columns [2] to [7]) and post-euro (columns [8] to [13]).  It presents 
summary  information  on  the  exchange  response  coefficients  (
i
2  )  for  each  country,  for  the 
Eurozone and the non-Eurozone firms, and for the sample overall.  It reports the number of 
exchange exposure coefficients (
i
2  ) that are negative, the number and proportion significant, the 
count significantly negative and significantly positive (at the 5 percent level or better), and the 
median absolute exchange exposure  response coefficient,  i
2 α .    Rather  than  using  the  actual 
exchange exposure response coefficients we follow Dominguez and Tesar (2001a and 2001b) and 
take the absolute values of the
i
2  s.  This is because the impact of exchange rate changes will 
vary between firms, yielding both negative and positive response coefficients.  For net exporters, 
for example, a depreciation of the home currency (making exports more competitive) should 
increase firm value, while for net importers a depreciation should reduce value.
2
We find that 121 of our firms pre-euro (10.5 percent) and 122 post-euro (10.6 percent) have 
significant exchange exposure after controlling for market effects.  The country with the highest 
proportion of significantly exposed firms in both periods is Switzerland, with more than a quarter 
of Swiss firms significantly exposed.  Swiss firms also have the greatest proportion of negative 
                                                
2 In conducting our analysis on the absolute value of the exchange exposure response  coefficients, an 
important question arises: is there an asymmetry between positive and negative response coefficients?  For 
example, are firms with negative coefficients more exposed in an absolute sense than firms with positive 
exchange exposure?  We check for differential exposure magnitude by dividing the significant exposure 
coefficients into positives and negatives, and testing whether these are significantly different in an absolute 
sense.  The median of the (absolute) negative coefficients is 1.94 and for the positives 2.01.  This difference 
is not significant using a Wilcoxon rank sum test (p = 0.77).6
exchange response coefficients relative to positive – a relation that would be expected for net 
exporters or firms with assets denominated in other currencies.  Germany has the lowest count of 
significantly exposed firms in the pre-euro period, and Sweden has the lowest in the post-euro.
It is clear from Table 2 that for firms in most countries, exchange exposure increased between the 
pre  and  post-euro  periods.    Columns  [14]  and  [15]  summarise  this  information;  [14]  is  the 
difference in the median absolute exchange exposure coefficient, and [15] contains the p-value 
for  a  Wilcoxon  rank  sum  test  of  difference.    None  of  the  Eurozone  countries  experience  a 
significant decline in median exchange exposure.  Median exposure falls for Belgium and the 
Netherlands,  but  these  are  small,  insignificant  reductions.    The  only  significant  reduction  in 
median exchange exposure occurred amongst Norwegian firms; the median fell from 1.00 to 0.61, 
and this is significant at the 5 percent level (p=0.05).  Of the remaining countries – whose median 
absolute exchange exposure coefficient increased from the pre- to the post-euro period – the 
increase is significant for German, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, Swiss and UK firms.  In fact, for 
4  of  our  7  Eurozone  countries,  firm-specific  exposure  increased  significantly  after  the 
introduction of the euro.  Another interesting change from pre to post-euro is that a reasonably 
even split between significantly negative and significantly positive (24 positive and 35 negative) 
exposure coefficients for Eurozone firms in the pre-euro period switches to a majority positive 
exposure  (49  positive  versus  15  negative).    The  vast  majority  of  Eurozone  firms  that  are 
significantly exposed have values that increase when the euro rises – a phenomenon that would 
be expected of net importers.  In contrast, the split of significant positives and negatives from 
period to period for the non-Eurozone firms remains almost the same.  
Consistent with expectations, more non-Eurozone firms are significantly affected by exchange 
exposure  in  both  periods.    In  the  pre-Eurozone  period,  8.4  percent  of  Eurozone  firms  are 
significantly exposed versus 13.7 percent of non-Eurozone, and in the post-Eurozone period the 
figures are 9.1 percent and 12.8 percent.  These differences are significant at standard levels using 
a z-test for difference in proportions (p = 0.00 and 0.04 for the pre-euro and post-euro periods 
respectively).  Although the proportion significant is higher for non-Eurozone firms, the median 
exchange exposure coefficients display the opposite pattern: in both the pre-euro and post-euro 
periods, the median exchange exposure coefficients are higher for the Eurozone firms.  In the pre-
euro period, the mean absolute response coefficient for the Eurozone firms is 0.58 and the non-
Eurozone 0.46, and in the post-euro period, the equivalent figures are 0.80 and 0.66.  These 
differences are significant using a Wilcoxon test (p = 0.00 for the pre-euro comparison and p = 7
0.01 for the post-euro period; not reported in the table).  In the pre-euro period, Eurozone firms 
are about 26 percent more exposed than non-Eurozone, and in the post-euro period the equivalent 
figure is 21 percent.  So while firm level exposures rises for both Eurozone and non-Eurozone 
firms after the introduction of the euro, exposure for non-Eurozone firms increases more.
4. Market-level exchange exposure
Recall that by estimating exchange exposure via the common method of equation [1], we control 
for market effects.  What is happening to exchange exposure at the market level?  Perhaps the 
effect of the euro’s introduction is systematic in nature; the increase in firm-level exposure may 
be offset by a reduction in exchange exposure at the market level.
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Here, the change in country j’s trade-weighted exchange rate index (
j
t s ) is regressed on the stock 
market  index  in  country  j  (
j
t R ),  and  the  coefficient 
j
1 β measures  the  extent of  market-level 
foreign exchange exposure in country j.
In  Table  3  we  present  the  findings  from  estimating  equation  [2]  to  determine  the  foreign 
exchange response coefficients 
j
1  for each of our 11 national stock markets in the pre-Eurozone 
and post-Eurozone periods.  In the pre-euro period, all of the Eurozone markets except Spain are 
significantly exposed to exchange rate movements, whereas our four non-Eurozone countries’ 
markets are not significantly exposed at standard levels.  The advent of the euro appears to have 
had  the  effect  for  the  Eurozone  countries  of  reducing  market  exposure  to  exchange  rate 
movements;  all  are  now  insignificantly  exposed.    The  non-Eurozone  markets  remain 
insignificantly  exposed  to  exchange  rate  changes,  except  for  Switzerland  whose  marginally 
significant exposure in the pre-euro period (p = 0.10) becomes significant (p = 0.01).  This pattern 
is consistent with membership of the Eurozone leading to a reduction in exposure to exchange 
rate changes at the market level.  With the exception of Italy and Spain, the Eurozone markets’ 
exchange exposure falls in absolute terms, and so does the exposure of Norway and Sweden.  
Exchange  exposure  for  Switzerland  rises,  and  the  UK’s  stays  about  the  same.    It  is  clear, 8
therefore, that an increase in firm-level exchange exposure is offset by a reduction of systematic 
or market-level exposure.
5. The determinants of firm-level exchange exposure
Our finding that the absolute exchange exposure for Eurozone firms is significantly higher than 
for non-Eurozone European firms after the advent of the euro warrants further investigation.  In 
this  section  we  conduct  pooled  cross-sectional  regressions  using  the  exchange  exposure 
coefficients 
i
2    estimated  via  equation  [1]  to  address  the  question,  can  this  difference  be 
explained by fundamental factors specific to the country or the firm?
5.1 Country-specific variables
Economic openness
A potential explanation for the weak findings associated with prior studies of firm-level exchange 
exposure is that the US is not a particularly open economy, and most studies have been conducted 
using US data.  Several studies looking at single or a few countries (Bodnar and Gentry (1993) 
Donnelly and Sheehy, 1996; He and Ng, 1998; Chen, Naylor and Lu, 2004; Glaum, Brunner and 
Himmel,  2000;  Nydahl,  2001;  see  Muller  and  Verschoor,  2006a  for  a  review)  point  to  the 
possibility that an economy’s openness influences the degree of exchange exposure, and Friberg 
and Nydahl (1999) found a significant positive relation between market-level exchange exposure 
and openness.  Hutson and Stevenson (2008) find a robust positive relation between economic 
openness and firm-level exchange exposure for a large sample from 23 countries.
We use the common measure of economic openness: trade openness, defined as exports plus 
imports as a percentage of GDP.  We obtain our trade openness figures from the Penn World 
Table Version 6.2, which is a recent release that provides openness figures up until 2004
3, and 
use the average of these annual figures for the period 1999-2004.  When looking at the possible 
relation  between  openness  and  exchange  for  Eurozone  countries,  it  is  appropriate  to  use  a 
measure of extra-Eurozone trade openness rather than total trade openness.  This is because a 
large proportion of these countries’ trade is with other Eurozone countries, and this trade is not 
                                                
3 Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center for International 
Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, September 2006.
(http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt62/pwt62_form.php).9
subject to exchange exposure.  Using Eurostat data, we estimate the proportion of exports and 
imports for each Eurozone country with trading partners outside the Eurozone, and amend the 
Penn openness measures accordingly.
4  
Trade  openness  for  our  sample  countries  is  depicted  in  Figure  1.    The  Eurozone  countries’ 
openness figures are depicted on the left-hand-side of the figure, and on the right-hand-side are 
the non-Eurozone figures, each ranked from left to right on overall openness.  For the Eurozone 
countries we also plot our estimate of extra-Eurozone trade openness.  On the standard measure 
of openness, Belgium and the Netherlands are by far the most open, with an average exports plus 
imports at 166 and 135 percent of GDP respectively.  The other countries have openness figures 
of less than 100 percent, and the openness of non-Eurozone Sweden, Switzerland and Norway 
very similar at 85, 85 and 76.  Most of the Eurozone countries – with the exception of Germany 
and Italy – trade mainly within the Eurozone.  For Portugal, for example, only 33 percent of trade 
is  outside  the  Eurozone.    Germany  has  the  largest  proportion  of  trade  with  non-Eurozone 
countries at 55 percent.  Clearly, the extra-Eurozone measure of openness reduces the apparent 
openness of the Eurozone countries considerably, and this is particularly evident for Belgium and 
the Netherlands.
Hedging
Several studies have shown that hedging activities reduce exchange exposure (Allayannis and 
Ofek, 2001; Nydahl, 2001; Pantzalis, Simkins and Laux, 2001).  As our approach to estimating 
firm-level exchange exposure (equation [1]) detects the exposure that remains after the firm has 
conducted  its  risk  management  activities,  we  include  in  our  cross-sectional  regressions  two 
country-specific factors that potentially affect the incentives faced by managers to hedge their 
foreign  exchange  risk:  shareholders’  rights  and  creditors’  rights.    We  also  use  several  firm-
specific factors that have been suggested to influence managers’ hedging decisions; these are 
discussed in section 5.2 below.  Several theories explain how firms can add value by hedging.  By 
                                                
4 It is not straightforward to compile data on extra-Eurozone trade.  The most recent detailed data on EU 
trade is available in the Eurostat statistical yearbook External and intra-European trade, data 1958-2006, 
which breaks down EU and extra-EU merchandise trade by country.  Unfortunately, the year book does not 
aggregate extra-Eurozone trade.  To estimate extra-Eurozone trade, for each country in our sample we 
summed the exports and then imports for its Eurozone trading partners.  We then subtracted this sum from 
the  year  book’s  figures  on  intra-EU  exports/imports,  and  added  this  to  the  figures  on  extra-EU 
exports/imports.    This  yielded  an  estimate  of  extra-Eurozone  merchandise  trade.    We  multiplied  the 
proportion of trade for each country that is extra-Eurozone (average for the period 1999-2004) by our 
original  openness  figures  from  the  Penn  world  table,  to  yield  an  estimate  of  average  extra-Eurozone 
openness.  It is unfortunately still a rough proxy because the Eurostat data cover only merchandise trade.10
reducing  the  volatility  of  expected  future  cash  flows,  the  likelihood  of  a  firm  encountering 
financial distress falls, reducing expected financial distress costs (Smith and Stulz, 1985).  Myers 
(1984) and Leland (1998) also suggest that a reduction in the likelihood of financial distress also 
facilitates  an  increase  in  debt  capacity,  giving  firms  a  greater  tax  benefit  of  debt.    Froot, 
Scharfstein and Stein (1993) suggeset that hedging increases firm value because it reduces the 
likelihood  that  the  firm  will  need  to  tap  external  capital  markets  (and  encounter  associated 
information  asymmetry  problems)  to  obtain  finance.    Allayanis  and  Weston  (2001)  find  a 
significantly positive relation between a firm’s use of foreign exchange derivatives and equity 
value, and Allayanis, Lel and Miller (2003) find that this ‘hedging premium’ is greater for firms 
in countries with superior protection of minority shareholders.  Lel (2006) finds that firms in 
countries with better shareholder protection are more likely to use derivatives, and he also finds 
that  derivative  use  is  more  likely  to  reduce  risk  when  corporate  governance  is  strong.    The 
findings  of  Allayanis,  Lel  and  Miller  (2003)  and  Lel  (2006)  support  the  shareholder  value 
theories of hedging, and they also suggest that managers  may neglect to  put in  place value-
enhancing hedging strategies in countries in which minority shareholders are weakly protected.  
We  use La  Porta et  al.’s (1998)  aggregate  measure of  shareholder rights  (they  use  the  term 
‘antidirector rights’) as our proxy for the strength of shareholder rights in each country.  We
anticipate an inverse relation between shareholder rights and firm-level exchange exposure; that 
is, we expect firms to be less exposed in countries with strong shareholder rights because their 
managers are more likely to hedge.
If hedging reduces the likelihood of a firm encountering financial distress or entering bankruptcy, 
there are implications for creditors as well as shareholders (Smith and Stulz, 1985).  Strong 
creditor  protection implies that creditors’ claims against the firm are  maximally  protected in 
bankruptcy proceedings against the claims and rights of management and owners.  Shareholders 
of firms in countries with strong creditor protection will therefore encounter relatively high costs 
of bankruptcy, so it is important for firms in these countries to hedge.  Allayanis, Lel and Miller 
(2003) find that as with shareholder rights, firms in countries with strong creditor rights have a 
higher  ‘hedging  premium’,  and  Hutson  and  Stevenson  (2008)  find  a  robust  inverse  relation 
between  creditor  rights  and  exchange  exposure.    We  use  La  Porta  et  al.’s  (1998)  aggregate 
measure of creditor rights as our proxy for the strength of creditor rights in each country.  The 
implication for exchange exposure is the same as for shareholder rights; we expect that firms in 
countries  with  strong  creditor  rights  will  have  lower  exposure  because  they  face  a  greater 
incentive to hedge foreign exchange risk.11
5.2 Firm-specific variables
Size
It is well established that small firms tend to be more exposed to exchange rate movements than 
large firms (Chow, Lee and Solt, 1997; Bodnar and Wong, 2003; Hunter, 2005; Dominguez and 
Tesar, 2006), and there are at least two reasons why this might be the case.  First, larger firms are 
more likely to hedge currency exposure because hedging activities exhibit economies of scale 
(Bodnar, Hayt and Marston, 1995, 1996, 1998; Berkman, Bradbury and Magan, 1997; Geczy, 
Minton  and  Schrand,  1997;  Nance,  Smith  and  Smithson,  1993;  Allayanis  and  Ofek,  2001; 
Hagelin and Pramborg, 2006).  Second, large firms are more likely to be multinational (Agarwal 
and  Ramaswami,  1992),  and  firms  that  operate  across  a  greater  number  of  countries  are 
associated with less exchange exposure (Pantzalis, Simkins and Laux, 2001).  Dominguez and 
Tesar (2006) and Hutson and Stevenson (2008) show that this relation may be nonlinear.  We 
define small firms as those below US$150 million, and according to this definition there are 517 
small firms (45 percent) in our sample.  We use a zero-one dummy to capture potential non-
linearities in the relation between exchange exposure and firm size, with 1 for small firms. 
Industry
Eurozone countries may have different industrial structures to non-Eurozone, which may in part 
explain the differences in exposure that we find.  Many studies have found that industries are 
affected differentially by exchange exposure (for example, Bodnar and Gentry, 1993; He and Ng, 
1998), and there are two main reasons for this.  First, some industries may be more likely to have 
international transactions, such as importing inputs or exporting finished goods, while for others 
such  as  utilities  direct  exchange  exposure  might  be  small.    Bodnar  and  Gentry  (1993),  for 
example, find that between 20 and 35 percent of industry sectors have statistically significant 
exchange rate exposure, while Griffin and Stulz (2001) find little significant exposure at the 
industry level.  This may be because firms in the sectors with a greater quantity of international 
transactions are more likely to hedge, and this was suggested by Dominguez and Tesar (2001b) as 
an explanation for their finding that trade, measured at the industry level, has little effect on firm-
level exchange exposure.  Second, industries will be exposed to different levels of competitive 
exposure.  Firms in some industries may be able to pass on to their customers increased costs or 
prices that result from exchange rate movements, while others will have less flexibility to do so.  12
Bodnar, Dumas and Marston (2002) suggest that the more competitive the industry and the less 
differentiated the product, the greater the exchange exposure.
Our 11 industry categories are formed on the basis of two and three-digit NAICS codes (the 
precise details of which are included in the notes to Table 4).  The industries are: chemicals; 
commodities and metals; construction and building products;  high-technology manufacturing; 
low-technology durables manufacturing; non-durables manufacturing; services; textile clothing 
and  footwear;  telecoms,  media  and  information;  utilities;  and  wholesale,  retail  and 
transportation.  Table 4 provides information on industry, including industry-specific mean and 
median absolute exposure coefficients (
i
2   estimated via equation [1]).  The largest industry 
category is low-tech durables manufacturing with 299 firms, and the smallest is commodities and 
metals with 32.  In terms of proportion of each industry category in the Eurozone versus non-
Eurozone countries, there are no industries that are concentrated in one category or the other, 
except perhaps for textiles, clothing and footwear which has a bigger presence in the Eurozone 
countries.  The industries that are the most exposed are high-technology manufacturing, services, 
and textiles, clothing and footwear, and the lowest levels of firm level exposure are experienced 
by firms in the utilities industry.  We control for industry using zero-one dummies in our pooled 
regression analysis.
Financial statement variables
We include several firm-specific factors that have been found to affect managers’ incentives to 
hedge: leverage (debt-to-assets), market-to-book, the quick ratio, and the dividend payout ratio.  
Leverage is a common proxy for the likelihood of financial distress.  Being a major ‘fixed claim’ 
against the cash flows of the firm, hedging becomes more valuable as leverage rises (Nance, 
Smith and Smithson, 1993). Further, potential underinvestment (Myers, 1977; Froot, Scharfstein 
and Stein, 1993) is more of a problem in high debt firms.  Other things being equal, the theories 
of hedging imply that firms with higher leverage have lower levels of exposure.  He and Ng 
(1997) found a strongly significant negative relation between leverage and exchange exposure for 
their sample of Japanese firms, but Muller and Verschoor (2006b) found a negative (although 
insignificant) relation for European  firms.    We use the  long-term debt-to-assets ratio
5  as the 
measure of firm-specific leverage.
                                                
5 Long-term debt and total assets are from Datastream (wc03251 and wc03501).13
The model of Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) predicts that firms with particularly costly 
external financing, such as those with considerable greater growth opportunities or firms whose 
assets are largely intangible (Titman and Wessels, 1988), benefit the most from hedging.  A 
common proxy for growth opportunities is market-to-book value of equity.  He and Ng (1997), 
who  include  market-to-book  as  an  independent  variable  in  their  study  of  Japanese  firms’ 
exposure, find weak evidence that firms with high market-to-book ratios have lower exchange 
exposure.  Our measure of growth opportunities is the market value of equity to book value of 
equity.
6
Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) suggest that firms can reduce the likelihood of incurring 
financial distress by maintaining a strong liquidity position  This can be achieved by restricting 
the  dividend payout or by holding high levels of cash and marketable securities, so that the 
propensity to hedge is negatively related to measures of short-term firm liquidity.  Empirical 
evidence on liquidity and exchange exposure is mixed.  Consistent with optimal hedging theory,
He  and  Ng (1997)  find  a significant  positive relation between  the  quick ratio and  exchange 
exposure and an inverse relation between exposure and the dividend payout ratio.  Muller and 
Verschoor (2006b) find a negative but insignificant coefficient on the quick ratio term, but their 
finding on dividends being negative related to exposure is stronger.  We use the quick ratio
7 as 
the measure of short-term firm-level liquidity, and the dividend payout ratio
8.
5.3 Firm-level pooled cross-sectional regression results
Table 5 presents summary information for the country and firm-level variables that we use in our 
cross-sectional analysis.  Panel A contains summary statistics and Panel B presents Spearman 
rank correlations.  The market-to-book ratio, quick ratio and market value variables are highly 
skewed to the right, so we take the natural log of these in our multivariate analysis.  For the debt-
to-assets, market-to-book and quick ratios, Eurozone firms are no different from non-Eurozone 
firms, but non-Eurozone firms pay higher dividends than Eurozone firms, and this is significant 
using a Wilcoxon paired rank sum test (p = 0.00).  This may in part explain why non-Eurozone 
firms  have  lower  exposure;  hedging  theory  suggests  that  firms  with  a  high  dividend  payout 
                                                
6 Market-to-book is Datastram code MTBV.
7 The quick ratio is Datastream code wc08101.
8 The dividend payout ratio is Datastream code POUT.14
should have a strong incentive to hedge.  Non-Eurozone firms are also larger by market value (p 
= 0.03), and the Eurozone sample contains a larger proportion of small firms than non-Eurozone 
(45 percent versus 39 percent).  The fact that more Eurozone firms are small may also provide a 
partial explanation as to why Eurozone firms have higher exposure than non-Eurozone.  
Using  our  measure  for  trade  openness  in  which  we  have  adjusted  the  Eurozone  countries’ 
openness figures to reflect extra-Eurozone openness only (see footnote 4), we find that non-
Eurozone  countries  are  significantly  more  open  than  Eurozone.    Generally  speaking,  non-
Eurozone countries have better shareholder and creditor rights than Eurozone.  This is particularly 
the case with shareholder rights; Norway, Sweden and the UK have high scores on shareholder 
rights, whereas Belgium, Germany and Italy score very low on this measure of governance.  The 
Spearman rank correlations in Panel B of Table 5 show relatively low correlations between the 
variables, which provides comfort regarding multicollinearity.
We estimate the following equation:
i 5 i 4 i , j 3 i , j 2 i , j 1 0 i MVDUM λ MV λ CR λ SHR λ OPEN λ λ ψ + + + + + = [3]
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Here,  i ψ  =
i
2  , with 
i
2   estimated via equation [1].  As well as taking their absolute values, it 
is  necessary  to  further  transform  the  exchange  response  coefficients 
i
2    because  taking  the 
absolute  value  causes  truncation  bias,  resulting  in  a  non-normal  error  term.    Following 
Dominguez  and  Tesar  (2006),  we  transform  the  firm-specific  absolute  exchange  response 
coefficients by taking their square root.  OPENj,i, SHj,i  and CRj,i are trade openness, shareholder 
rights and creditor rights for country (j) in which firm i is listed.  MVi, is the size of firm i as 
measured by market value and MVDUMi, which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for 
firms with a market value of less than US$150 million and zero otherwise, and INDDUMi
k (k = 1-
11) refers to the industry dummies.  DAi is the average debt-to-assets ratio for firm i, MTBi is firm 
i’s average market-to-book ratio, QRi is firm i’s average quick ratio and DIVi is firm i’s dividend 
payout ratio.  Because they are skewed to the right, we take the natural log of the variables MV,
MTB and QR.  Finally, EURDUMi is a dummy variable equal to one for firms in  Eurozone 
countries and zero for firms in non-Eurozone countries.15
Our results from estimating equation [3] can be found in Table 6.
9  We estimate the equation 
twice; first on the full data set of 1,147 firms, and then using a restricted data set that includes 
only those firms for which we found a significant (at the 10 percent level or better) exchange 
exposure coefficient 
i
2  in equation [1].  The first point to note about our multivariate findings is 
the improved explanatory power when restricting the data set to include the significant exposure 
coefficients only; the adjusted R-sq rises from 0.08 percent for the full sample to 0.32 for the 
restricted sample regression.  It is also important to note that the findings change little when the 
data set is restricted, and this gives us confidence about the robustness of our results.  We find 
that  after  controlling  for  several  country-  and  firm-specific  factors,  there  is  essentially  no 
difference  between  Eurozone  and  non-Eurozone  firm-level  exchange  exposure;  in  both 
regressions the Eurozone dummy is not significant (p = 0.26 and 0.32).
Three of our firm-level dependent variables – market-to-book ratio, dividend payout ratio and 
firm size – are strongly significant determinants of firm-level exchange exposure.  Consistent 
with many prior studies (Chow, Lee and Solt, 1997; Bodnar and Wong, 2003; Hunter, 2005; 
Dominguez and Tesar, 2006), smaller firms are significantly more exposed than large, and the 
coefficient on the size dummy variable relation is stronger for firms with a market value of less 
than US$150 million (although this is significant only at the 10 percent level for the full data set).  
The dividend payout ratio is significantly inversely related to exchange exposure, and this is 
consistent with optimal hedging theories.  Firms with a low dividend payout ratio are conserving 
short-term liquidity and so have less need to hedge, in which case they experience greater levels 
of exchange exposure.  This is consistent with Nance, Smith and Smithson’s (1993) idea that a 
larger  short-term  liquidity position  mitigates the  expected costs  of  financial distress  and  can 
therefore be seen as a substitute for hedging.  Unfortunately the sign on the quick ratio variable is 
also negative, and this is opposite to the prediction of optimal hedging theory, although it is not 
significant in either specification.  Creditor rights is significant and negative in the full sample 
regression, implying that shareholders of firms in countries with strong creditor protection face 
high  bankruptcy  costs,  and  that  managers  hedge  risks  in  order  to  reduce  the  likelihood  of 
bankruptcy.  The coefficient is the same but is not significant in the restricted sample regression.  
Lastly, openness is not significant in either regression.  Recall that for the Eurozone countries, 
trade openness is adjusted to remove intra-Eurozone trade from the overall openness figure.  Our 
                                                
9 For the sake of brevity the industry coefficients are not reported in the table.  None were found to be 
significant, and their presence added little power to the regressions. 16
finding  is  perhaps  not  surprising  given  that  measuring  openness  in  this  way  resulted  in  the 
Eurozone  countries’  openness  figures  being  lower  than  non-Eurozone  openness  –  thus 
contributing nothing to explaining why Eurozone firms’ exposure is higher.
6. Concluding comments
In this paper we have examined the exchange exposure experience of 1,147 firms in 7 Eurozone 
and 4 non-Eurozone European countries before and after the introduction of the single currency.  
Using univariate tests, we find that Eurozone firms’ exchange exposure is significantly greater 
than that of non-Eurozone firms.  We also find that although exchange exposure increased from 
the pre-euro to the post-euro period for firms within and outside the Eurozone, the increase was 
smaller for the former than for the latter.  Our finding that foreign exchange exposure has risen 
for Eurozone firms suggests that there may be some effect operating at the level of the market.  In 
order to investigate this, we examined whether there is any difference between the extent to 
which  stock  market  returns  are  affected  by  exchange  rate  changes  before  and  after  the 
introduction of the euro.  We find that market-level exposures have declined within the Eurozone 
by more than they have outside it.  Finally, we have examined a set of country-level and firm-
level  variables  to  address  the  question  of  why  Eurozone  firms  are  more  exposed  than  non-
Eurozone  firms.    When  we  control  for  these  variables,  there  is  no  difference  between  the 
exposure of Eurozone firms and those in our four non-Eurozone European countries. 
The elimination of risk for intra-Eurozone transactions has been touted as an important benefit of 
Eurozone membership.  While it is unquestionable that intra-Eurozone transactions are no longer 
associated  with  exchange  risk,  there  has  been  very  little  empirical  analysis  examining  the 
exchange exposure experience of Eurozone firms.  Our finding that Eurozone firms’ exposure 
increased less than non-Eurozone firms provides evidence that Eurozone membership has indeed 
provided  some  protection  from  higher  foreign  exchange  exposure  that  has  been  borne  by 
European firms in general.  Finally, lower market-level exposure has helped to offset higher firm-
level exposure.  Our findings are consistent with the notion that the advent of the euro has been 
associated with a shift in exchange risk from systematic to firm-specific amongst Eurozone firms.17
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Table 1 Exchange rate volatility and exchange rate arrangements
Pre-euro Post-euro Exchange rate arrangements
Mean SD Mean SD
Eurozone countries
Belgium  0.04 0.78 0.04 0.67 Eurozone
a
France  0.07 0.78 0.04 0.68 Eurozone
a
Germany  0.08 0.93 0.06 0.83 Eurozone
a
Italy  -0.21 1.84 0.08 0.74 Eurozone (ERM 1979 to 1992, euro 1999)
Netherlands  0.02 0.76 0.04 0.73 Eurozone
a
Portugal  -0.06 0.93 0.03 0.43 Eurozone (ERM 1992, euro 1999)
Spain -0.23 1.15 0.03 0.49 Eurozone (ERM 1989)
Average -0.04 1.02 0.05 0.65
Non-Eurozone countries
Norway  -0.09 0.99 0.13 1.42 Independent float (fixed to 1992; managed float 1992 to 2001)
Sweden  -0.22 1.75 0.01 1.29 Independent float (fixed to 1991; ERM 1991-92)
Switzerland  0.12 1.40 0.05 1.03 Independent float (1973)
UK  0.03 1.75 0.01 1.16 Independent float (managed float to 1990, ERM 1990-92)
Average -0.04 1.47 0.05 1.23
Notes.  This table presents summary statistics for the exchange rates, and provides a brief summary of the 
exchange rate arrangements over the sample period.  The data are monthly IMF trade-weighted exchange rates 
sourced from Datastream.  The  means and standard deviations of the log change in  the exchange rates are 
reported in the table.  The pre-euro period runs from January 1990 to December 1998, and the post-euro period 
begins January 1999 and ends January 2008.22
Table 2 Firm-level exchange exposure response coefficients
Pre-euro period Post-euro period
































Belgium  38 26 6 15.8 3 3 0.85 10 4 10.5 4 0 0.78 -0.07 0.70
France  174 91 12 6.9 6 6 0.79 73 15 8.6 15 0 0.83 0.04 0.83
Germany  256 149 14 5.5 3 11 0.54 113 23 9.0 17 6 0.79 0.25 0.00
Italy  88 42 8 9.1 5 3 0.3 42 8 9.1 5 3 0.57 0.27 0.00
Netherlands  68 41 12 17.6 3 9 0.83 30 7 10.3 3 4 0.78 -0.05 0.89
Portugal  34 16 3 8.8 2 1 0.77 15 3 8.8 2 1 2.42 1.65 0.01
Spain  44 17 4 9.1 2 2 0.56 20 4 9.1 3 1 0.88 0.32 0.02
Eurozone total 702 382 59 8.4 24 35 0.58 303 64 9.1 49 15 0.8 0.22 0.00
Non-Eurozone firms
Norway  29 14 3 10.3 1 2 1 18 5 17.2 0 5 0.61 -0.39 0.05
Sweden  63 27 5 7.9 2 3 0.46 43 3 4.8 0 3 0.46 0.00 0.73
Switzerland  98 96 32 32.7 2 30 1.02 79 26 26.5 0 26 1.2 0.18 0.06
UK  262 87 22 8.4 18 4 0.32 73 24 9.2 22 2 0.66 0.34 0.00
Non-Eurozone total 452 224 62 13.7 23 39 0.46 213 58 12.8 22 36 0.66 0.20 0.00




Notes.  This table summarises information on the exchange rate response coefficients 
i
2  from estimating equation (1).  Separated into pre-euro and post-
euro periods, we present for each country and for the Eurozone countries, the non-Eurozone countries, and the sample overall, the number of firms, N, the 
number negative, the number and percent significant, the number significantly positive and negative, and the median absolute 
i
2  .  Column [14] presents 
the difference in the median absolute 
i
2   between the post and pre-euro period, and [15] contains the p-value for the associated Wilcoxon rank sum test of 
difference.23
Table 3 Market exchange exposure










value R-Sq Var 
j
t s Covar
Belgium -2.459 0.00 0.15 0.61 -1.49 0.641 0.31 0.01 0.45 0.29
France -2.843 0.00 0.14 0.61 -1.72 -1.015 0.19 0.02 0.47 -0.47
Germany -1.957 0.00 0.11 0.87 -1.68 -0.991 0.22 0.02 0.68 -0.67
Italy 0.655 0.02 0.03 3.38 2.19 -0.729 0.26 0.01 0.54 -0.39
Netherlands -3.027 0.00 0.20 0.57 -1.72 -0.956 0.19 0.01 0.53 -0.50
Portugal -1.016 0.06 0.02 0.86 -0.87 -0.853 0.34 0.01 0.18 -0.15
Spain -0.295 0.63 0.00 1.32 -0.39 -1.794 0.11 0.03 0.24 -0.43
Norway -0.359 0.67 0.00 0.99 -0.35 -0.051 0.88 0.00 2.03 -0.10
Sweden -0.548 0.32 0.02 3.07 -1.67 0.411 0.30 0.01 1.65 0.67
Switzerland -0.628 0.10 0.03 1.93 -1.20 -1.252 0.01 0.09 1.35 -0.17
UK -0.120 0.71 0.00 3.05 -0.36 -0.126 0.65 0.00 0.97 -1.20
Notes.  This table presents the findings for the relation between each country’s local currency monthly log 
difference stock market return (
j
t R ) and the log difference change in its trade-weighted exchange rate (
j
t s ).  
j
1   is the exchange response coefficient for country j estimated via equation [2].  The associated p-value and 
the R-sq for the equation are reported in the adjacent columns.   In this table we separate 
j





t R ) and Var (
j
t s ).  The pre-euro period runs from January 1990 to December 1998, and the 
post-euro period begins January 1999 and ends January 2008.24
Table 4 Industry information







Chemicals 77 24 53 0.05 0.08 0.93 0.59
Commodities and metals 32 10 22 0.02 0.03 0.82 0.49
Construction and building products 58 16 42 0.04 0.06 0.91 0.80
High-tech manufacturing 94 41 53 0.09 0.08 1.34 1.04
Low-tech durables manufacturing 299 119 180 0.26 0.26 1.10 0.69
Non-durables manufacturing 89 27 62 0.06 0.09 0.78 0.54
Services 185 80 105 0.18 0.15 1.23 0.90
Textile, clothing and footwear 56 15 41 0.03 0.06 1.21 0.78
Telecoms, media and information 54 24 30 0.05 0.04 1.08 0.81
Utilities 89 36 53 0.08 0.08 0.76 0.51
Wholesale, retail and transportation 121 60 61 0.13 0.09 1.01 0.64
1154 452 702
Notes.  This table summarises industry affiliation.  The table details the number of firms Our 11 industries are 
based  on  the  NAICS  codes,  as  follows:  chemicals  325  and  326;  commodities  and  metals:  11-21  and  331; 
construction and building products: 23 and 327; high-technology manufacturing 334-335 and 3364 (aerospace); 
low-technology durables manufacturing: 321-324, 331-333, 336-339; non-durables manufacturing: 311 and 312; 
services:  52-92;  textile,  clothing  and  footwear:  313-316;  telecoms,  media  and  information:  51,  utilities:  22, 
wholesale, retail and transportation: 42-49.  25
Table 5 Summary information – dependent variables in the multivariate analysis
Eurozone Non-eurozone
Mean Median Skew Mean Median Skew p-value
Panel A: Summary statistics
Debt-to-assets 0.28 0.25 0.60 0.27 0.25 0.59 0.85
Market-to-book 2.90 1.50 11.59 2.76 1.38 14.06 0.31
Quick ratio 1.52 0.92 21.43 1.26 0.96 15.96 0.69
Dividend payout (%) 31.62 29.82 0.46 36.35 37.69 0.06 0.00
Market value 2437.6 159.2 6.4 2898.3 221.3 8.9 0.03
Proportion small  0.45 0.39
Openness 36.42 38.13 69.06 58.43 0.00
Shareholder rights 1.82 4.01 0.00
Creditor rights 1.82 2.94 0.00
Panel B: Spearman rank correlations
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Debt-to-assets 1 0.05 -0.38 -0.09 0.20 -0.03 -0.12 -0.13
2. Market-to-book 1 0.00 0.01 0.38 0.01 -0.15 0.04
3. Quick ratio 1 0.00 -0.02 0.02 -0.16 -0.11
4. Dividend payout ratio 1 0.27 -0.01 0.00 0.15
5. Market value 1 0.03 0.00 -0.07
6. Openness 1 0.10 0.20
7. Shareholder rights 1 0.27
8. Creditor rights 1
Notes.  In this table we present summary data on the dependent variables that we use in the multivariate analysis, 
separately for the Eurozone and non-Eurozone firms.  The financial ratio variables are drawn from Hutson and 
Kearney (2008) and they are averages for the period 1999-2003.  Market value is market capitalisation in US 
dollars at the end of 2003.  Openness is average trade openness for each country drawn from the Penn World 
Table Version 6.2, for the period 1999-2004 (from Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World 
Table Version 6.2, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of 
Pennsylvania, September 2006; http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt62/pwt62_form.php), with the Eurozone 
countries’  openness  figures  adjusted  to  reflect  extra-Eurozone  trade  only  (see  footnote  4  for  details).    The 
column  headed  p-value  is  the  p-value  for  a  Wilcoxon  rank  sum  test  for  difference  between  each  variable 
Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries.  Panel B presents the Spearman rank correlations for the same variables.  26
                                    
Table 6 Multivariate analysis results
Full data set 
(n = 1,154)








Quick ratio -0.029 -0.013
(0.17) (0.16)
Dividend payout ratio -0.003 -0.004
(0.00) (0.00)
Market value -0.047 -0.054
(0.00) (0.00)
Size dummy -0.075 -0.029
(0.09) (0.69)
Openness  0.001 -0.003
(0.64) (0.33)
Shareholder rights 0.014 0.018
(0.40) (0.54)
Creditor rights -0.024 -0.024
(0.04) (0.20)
Eurozone dummy 0.099 0.152
(0.26) (0.32)
Adj. R-sq.    0.08     0.32
Notes.  This table presents the results for our pooled regression analysis
of equation [3].  The dependent variable is the exchange exposure of 
firm i, as measured by  i
2   (with 
i
2   estimated via equation [1]).  This 
model is first estimated on the full data set with n = 1,154 and then on a 
restricted data set, comprising those firms for which 
i
2   is significant at 
the 10 percent level or better.27
































Notes.  This figure presents the average economic openness measures for the period 
1999-2004.  Openness is exports plus imports over GDP, and is drawn from Alan 
Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center 
for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of 
Pennsylvania, September 2006.  Extra-Eurozone openness is calculated by taking 
the Penn  data  and adjusting  it to  reflect the  proportion  of extra-Eurozone trade 
using trade data from the Eurostat statistical yearbook External and intra-European 
trade,  data  1958-2006.  More detail  about  how this  was done  can be  found in 
footnote 4.  